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Abstract
We present the first meta-analysis of the income elasticity of water demand that accounts
for the effects of publication selection (the preferential reporting of estimates that are in-
tuitive and statistically significant). Paradoxically, more affected by publication selection
are the otherwise preferable estimates that control for endogeneity. Because such estimates
tend to be smaller and less precise, they are often statistically insignificant, which leads
to more intense specification searching and bias. Correcting simultaneously for publication
and endogeneity biases, we find that the underlying elasticity is approximately 0.15 or less.
The result is robust to controlling for 30 other characteristics of the estimates and using
Bayesian model averaging to account for model uncertainty. The differences in the reported
estimates are systematically driven by differences in the tariff structure, regional coverage,
data granularity, and control for temperature in the demand equation.
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1 Introduction
The growing scarcity of drinking water represents a major global risk (WEF, 2015). To un-
derstand how the consumption of water will evolve when developing countries get richer, we
need reliable estimates of the income elasticity of water demand. The parameter is also used
by policy makers to design efficient and equitable environmental water policies. Researchers
have long sought to pin down this crucial parameter but have yet to reach consensus. The two
previous quantitative surveys conducted on this topic, Dalhuisen et al. (2003) and Sebri (2014),
put the representative estimate in the literature between 0.2 and 0.4 and focus on the drivers
of heterogeneity in the reported income elasticities. Neither of these studies, however, corrects
the literature for publication bias, and neither accounts for model uncertainty when explaining
the heterogeneity behind the estimates. In this paper we collect 307 estimates of the income
elasticity of water demand and analyze the variation behind these estimates, paying special
attention to publication bias, endogeneity bias, and model uncertainty.
Publication bias arises from the tendency of researchers, editors, and referees to publish
results that are either significant or have the desired sign. In theory, water is a necessity with no
obvious substitutes; therefore, common sense dictates that the income elasticity of water should
be positive and statistically significant. But if the underlying elasticity that we try to estimate
is sufficiently small and our data and methods sufficiently imprecise, we should get negative
or statistically insignificant estimates from time to time. If such estimates are underreported,
publication bias arises. In a related study on the price elasticity of water demand, Stanley
(2005) finds that publication bias exaggerates the estimates fourfold. The studies estimating
the price elasticity of water demand typically also estimate the income elasticity, often in the
same equation. This demonstrates the importance of accounting for publication selection.
The endogeneity problem in water demand equations is well documented and has been
explored by previous meta-analyses. Here we offer a twist to the typical story that estimates
accounting for endogeneity are always preferable. This statement holds when no publication
selection exists. But if publication selection constitutes a problem, as we show is the case,
estimates based on instrumental variables give rise to more publication selection because they are
typically less precise than OLS estimates and, in this particular case, also smaller. Researchers
seeking to control for endogeneity while simultaneously providing estimates that are publishable
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(intuitive and statistically significant) are sometimes forced to pursue a lengthy search for the
desired specification with a point estimate that is large enough to offset the standard error.
It follows that OLS estimates are exaggerated by endogeneity bias, while IV estimates are
exaggerated by publication bias, and the simple mean reported elasticities might not vary
substantially between these two approaches.
Indeed, our results suggest that the income elasticity of water demand is, on average, biased
upwards due to publication bias and that the extent of bias is linked to the treatment of endo-
geneity. Publication bias is absent from estimates produced by methods ignoring endogeneity
(such as OLS). By contrast, while methods controlling for endogeneity (such as IV) report esti-
mates corrected for endogeneity bias, these estimates are correlated with their standard errors
and collectively suffer from publication bias. As a result, although researchers address endo-
geneity bias at the level of individual studies, the resulting publication bias means that the
mean reported estimate is not closer to the underlying value of the income elasticity. This in-
terplay between the two biases is too complex for any narrative survey to decipher, and the use
of meta-analysis is therefore crucial. The two biases cause the reported estimates to be similar
for IV and OLS methods, which has led previous meta-analyses to conclude that correcting for
endogeneity, while theoretically laudable, has little practical benefit. We argue otherwise.
Furthermore, we collect 32 method and data characteristics that should help us explain
the differences among the estimated elasticities. The large number of characteristics, however,
means that we face model uncertainty, so we depart from the frequentist methods of the previous
meta-analyses and instead apply Bayesian model averaging (model averaging techniques are also
available in frequentist econometrics, but they are less flexible, and their application with so
many variables is nearly infeasible). Bayesian model averaging runs millions of regressions that
include the possible subsets of all of the explanatory variables. Consequently, it constructs a
weighted average over these regressions, where each weight is approximately proportional to the
goodness of fit of the respective regression. The results of Bayesian model averaging enable us to
construct a “best-practice” estimate in the literature conditional on numerous data and method
choices, which is another value added of meta-analysis. It follows that the income elasticity of
water demand is likely 0.15 or even less, smaller than usually perceived, and in any case the
literature is inconsistent with values of the elasticity over 0.5.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data collection
approach and the basic properties of the data set. Section 3 tests for the presence of publica-
tion selection bias and explores its relationship with endogeneity bias. Section 4 investigates
the data, method, and publication heterogeneity in the estimated income elasticities and con-
structs best-practice estimates for different pricing schemes. Section 5 concludes the paper. An
online appendix, available at meta-analysis.cz/water, provides the data and code to allow other
researchers to replicate our results.
2 The Data Set
To estimate the income elasticity of water demand, researchers usually employ a variant of the
following model:
lnConsumptionit = α+ PED · lnPriceit + Y ED · ln Incomeit + Controlsijt + it, (1)
where Consumptionit denotes the water consumption of household i in period t, Price denotes
the price of water, and Income denotes household income. The vector Controlsijt represents
a set of explanatory variables j, such as household characteristics (the number of household
members, distinction between primary and secondary residences, garden size, and the number
of bathrooms) or climate variables (temperature, rainfall, and evaporation). The coefficient
PED is the price elasticity of water demand;  is the error term. The coefficient YED denotes
the income elasticity, the effect in question of this meta-analysis, and captures by how many
percent the demand for water changes if the household’s income increases by one percent. As
in any other meta-analysis, we begin by collecting the reported estimates from the empirical
literature. We exploit previously published meta-analyses by Dalhuisen et al. (2003) and Sebri
(2014) and extend the data sample by searching the Google Scholar database; the search query
is available online at meta-analysis.cz/water. We add the last study on March 6, 2016.
To be included in the meta-analysis, the studies must conform to three criteria: 1) the
study must estimate a water demand equation and report an empirical estimate of YED ; 2)
the study must estimate the log-log functional form of a demand equation, as in (1), to display
a constant YED ; and 3) the study must report a measure of uncertainty around the estimate,
typically the standard error. Several studies do not conform to these criteria. For example,
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Saleth & Dinar (1997) do not use the straightforward income variable in the demand function
but instead proxy for income using housing categories. Schefter & David (1985) estimate the
level-level linear functional form of (1), while Gibbs (1978) and Jones & Morris (1984) estimate
the semi-log functional form of (1). Gaudin et al. (2001) and Nieswiadomy (1992) do not report
standard errors for their estimates.
Our final data sample comprises 307 income elasticity estimates taken from 62 studies listed
in Table 1. The oldest study was published in 1972 and the most recent one in 2015, which
means that this meta-analysis covers as long a period of time as the two previous meta-analyses
combined. The apparently right-skewed distribution of estimates is shown in Figure 1. The
reported elasticities range from −0.45 to 2.8 and are characterized by a mean of 0.26 and a
median of 0.16. Less than 3% of the estimates are larger than 1, which suggests that the demand
for water is inelastic with respect to income. More than 94% of the estimates are higher than 0,
which supports the intuition that water is not an inferior good. The double-peakedness of the
histogram indicates the presence of systematic heterogeneity in the estimates; moreover, Figure 5
reveals the presence of substantial within- and between-study variation. Consequently, for each
estimate we collect 30 explanatory variables describing the characteristics of the estimation
models and investigate the possible reasons for heterogeneity in Section 4.
Table 1: Studies used in the meta-analysis
Agthe & Billings (1980) Gaudin (2005) Nieswiadomy & Molina (1991)
Al-Najjar et al. (2011) Gaudin (2006) Olmstead (2009)
Al-Qunaibet & Johnston (1985) Hanemann & Nauges (2005) Olmstead et al. (2007)
Asci & Borisova (2014) Hewitt (1993) Piper (2003)
Ayadi et al. (2002) Hewitt & Hanemann (1995) Polycarpou & Zachariadis (2013)
Bartczak et al. (2009) Hoffmann et al. (2006) Reynaud et al. (2005)
Basani et al. (2008) Hoglund (1999) Rietveld et al. (1997)
Billings (1982) Horn (2011) Schleich & Hillenbrand (2009)
Billings & Agthe (1980) Hussain et al. (2002) Sebri (2013)
Binet et al. (2012) Jia & Bao (2014) Statzu & Strazzera (2009)
Binet et al. (2014) Lyman (1992) Strand & Walker (2005)
Carter & Milon (2005) Mansur & Olmstead (2012) Strong & Smith (2010)
Cheesman et al. (2008) Miyawaki et al. (2011) Tabieh et al. (2012)
Dalmas & Reynaud (2004) Monteiro & Roseta-Palma (2011) Taylor et al. (2004)
Darr et al. (1975) Musolesi & Nosvelli (2007) Williams (1985)
Dharmaratna & Parasnis (2011) Mylopoulos et al. (2004) Williams & Suh (1986)
Fenrick & Getachew (2012) Nauges & Strand (2007) Wong (1972)
Foster & Beattie (1979) Nauges & Thomas (2003) Yoo (2007)
Foster & Beattie (1981) Nauges & Van Den Berg (2009) Younes & Matoussi (2011)
Frondel & Messner (2008) Nieswiadomy (1992) Zapata (2015)
Garcia & Reynaud (2004) Nieswiadomy & Cobb (1993)
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Figure 1: The histogram suggests substantial heterogeneity and
under-reporting of negative estimates
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Estimate of the income elasticity of water demand
Notes: The figure depicts a histogram of the estimates of the income elastici-
ties of water demand reported by individual studies. The dashed vertical line
denotes the sample median; the solid vertical line denotes the sample mean.
To gain a first insight into the potential causes of heterogeneity we compute mean values
of the income elasticity estimates for different groups of data, methods, and publication char-
acteristics. Table 2 reports the results for both unweighted estimates and estimates weighted
by the inverse of the number of estimates per study, such that studies with many estimates
do not drive the mean. We show that short-run elasticities are, on average, 0.1 larger than
long-run elasticities. The difference, however, disappears when we give each study the same
weight; hence, we do not further divide our sample between short- and the long-run elasticities
but analyze the pooled data set while controlling for this difference (which is in accordance with
the approach of the previous meta-analyses Dalhuisen et al., 2003; Sebri, 2014). On the one
hand, studies using data aggregated at the municipal level yield nearly identical estimates to
studies that employ individual household data. On the other hand, the difference between the
published and unpublished studies is robust to weighting and fluctuates around 0.1. Differences
in results based on publication outlet often, although not necessarily, indicate the presence of
publication bias in the literature, as we will discuss below.
Table 2 further suggests that the reported elasticities vary across countries. First, the mean
elasticities are consistently higher for the United States, lower for Europe, and even lower for
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Table 2: Income elasticity estimates for different subsets of data
Unweighted Weighted
No. of observations Mean 95% conf. int. Mean 95% conf. int.
Temporal dynamics
Short-run elasticity 216 0.291 -0.025 0.783 0.275 0.003 0.760
Long-run elasticity 91 0.189 0.022 0.684 0.256 -0.004 0.753
Aggregation level
Household data 194 0.254 0.004 0.779 0.289 0.020 0.753
Aggregate data 113 0.273 -0.060 0.760 0.243 -0.012 0.640
Publication status
Unpublished studies 66 0.347 0.020 1.450 0.366 .040 1.450
Published studies 241 0.237 -0.12 0.683 0.254 -0.006 0.683
Spatial variation
US 136 0.324 -0.028 1.450 0.323 -0.012 1.450
Europe 51 0.261 0.053 0.753 0.252 0.027 0.753
Other than US or Europe 120 0.188 0.002 0.675 0.220 0.003 0.650
Developed countries 201 0.295 -0.009 0.781 0.290 -0.004 0.753
Developing countries 106 0.195 0.004 0.700 0.227 0.003 0.650
Estimation technique
No endogeneity control 142 0.268 -0.012 0.685 0.285 0.010 0.685
Endogeneity control 165 0.255 -0.004 0.781 0.260 -0.004 0.753
All estimates 307 0.261 -0.008 0.760 0.270 -0.004 0.753
Notes: The table reports mean values of the income elasticity estimates for different subsets of data. The exact variable
definitions are available in Table 4. Weighted = estimates are weighted by the inverse of the number of estimates per study.
the rest of the countries in our sample. Second, the mean elasticities show that the level of
development matters: studies of developed countries report estimates that are 0.1 higher than
studies of developing countries, on average. This result is, however, counter-intuitive: one would
expect that households from developing countries would more vigorously use the opportunity
to consume more water when they are able to afford to do so compared to households from
developed countries. This result might be explained by different expenditure structures. The
income elasticity in developed countries may be higher since water in some cases becomes a
luxury good (used for filling up swimming pools, washing cars, and watering lawns). Similarly,
the income elasticity in developing countries may be lower since a significantly higher proportion
of income goes to other necessities, such as food or clothing.
A common problem associated with demand equations with block rates is that prices are
endogenously determined by the quantity demanded. Therefore, researchers using estimation
techniques that do not account for endogeneity violate the assumption of no correlation be-
tween the explanatory variables and the error term. Some authors acknowledge the prob-
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lem and attempt to justify their ‘inappropriate’ method choice (for example Foster & Beattie,
1979, disregard endogeneity due to nature of their data set), but few test for simultaneity,
as in Nieswiadomy & Molina (1989) using the Hausman (1978) test or Williams (1985) using
a Ramsey-type test. Some researchers even argue that given the similarity of estimates pro-
duced by OLS (not accounting for endogeneity) and the use of instruments (IV-based techniques
accounting for endogeneity), simple OLS might suffice for demand analyses under block-rate
pricing (see the detailed methodological survey of Arbues et al., 2003, who follow the arguments
originally advanced by Saleth & Dinar, 1997).
Our comparison of the reported income elasticities between the estimation techniques ac-
counting for endogeneity (such as the IV method or the generalized method of moments) and
estimation techniques disregarding endogeneity (generally OLS and random effects) appears to
be consistent with that of Arbues et al. (2003): based on the simple and weighted means from
Table 2 we do not observe any large differences between the estimation techniques. Although
Arbues et al. (2003) mentions that OLS under different block tariffs may underestimate or
overestimate demand elasticity depending on whether the supply schedule is steeper than the
demand schedule, based on our simple analysis one would argue that estimated elasticities do
not depend on whether a researcher addresses the problem of endogeneity. This conclusion
would be in line with previous meta-analyses on elasticities of water demand (Espey et al.,
1997; Dalhuisen et al., 2003; Sebri, 2014), which do not find significant dependencies between
the different estimation techniques and the estimated water demand elasticities.
None of the previous meta-analyses, however, has tested for publication selection. Publica-
tion bias, if present, can seriously distort the picture offered by the literature (Doucouliagos &
Stanley, 2013). For example, Stanley (2005), correcting the results of Dalhuisen et al. (2003) for
publication bias, finds the estimates of the price elasticity of water demand to be exaggerated
fourfold. Ashenfelter et al. (1999), who test for publication bias in estimates of the schooling-
earnings relationship, report that publication bias plagues the IV estimates, which typically
yield higher standard errors (and thus researchers search for systematically higher estimates to
achieve the desired level of statistical significance). It follows that the comparison of sample
averages sheds some light on the sources of the heterogeneity of the estimates, but it does not
reflect the differences in the underlying elasticity if the estimates are subject to publication bias.
8
3 Detecting Publication Bias
Publication bias arises when some estimates have a higher probability of being reported than
other estimates. Researchers may prefer to report strong (i.e., statistically significant) and
useful findings that tell a good story; editors and referees may prefer significant findings that
are in line with theory. Theoretically, since water does not have any close substitute, once
the household’s income increases, the demand for water should also increase. Therefore, water
cannot be considered an inferior good, and its income elasticity of demand should be positive.
Given the strong case for positive estimates, it is not surprising that researchers treat negative
estimates with suspicion. Hence Rietveld et al. (1997, p. 30) comment on their estimated
income elasticities as follows: “The results are terrible. . . parameters are having the ‘wrong’
[negative] sign. . . ” The previous meta-analyses on elasticities of water demand (Espey et al.,
1997; Dalhuisen et al., 2003; Sebri, 2014) call the price elasticities with the unintuitive sign
‘perverse’ and eliminate them from their samples.
But even by the law of chance, negative estimates of income elasticity should occasionally
appear in the literature. The probability of negative estimates increases with small samples,
noisy data, or misspecification of the demand function (more in Stanley, 2005). Consequently,
researchers tend to suppress their negative estimates; such a practice would, even if beneficial
at the level of individual studies, drive the global mean of the reported elasticities upwards.
Doucouliagos & Stanley (2013) find that most fields of economic research are affected by pub-
lication selection bias. The field of energy and resource economics research is no exception:
Havranek et al. (2012) and Havranek & Kokes (2015) find publication bias in the literature
estimating the price and income elasticities of gasoline demand, while Havranek et al. (2015)
report the same problem in the literature on the social cost of carbon.
The most common visual tool used for the investigation of the presence of publication bias is
the funnel plot (Egger et al., 1997). Figure 2 depicts the plot for all 307 estimates of the income
elasticity of water demand on the horizontal axis and the inverse of the standard error of an
estimate used as a measure of precision on the vertical axis. Ideally, the plot should resemble an
inverted funnel: the estimates with the highest precision should be close to the true effect, while
the estimates with decreasing precision are more dispersed from the mean (Havranek & Irsova,
2016). If publication bias is present, the funnel is asymmetrical (when the bias is related to the
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sign of the effect) and hollow and wide (when the bias is related to the significance of the effect).
In Figure 2 we observe that the left-hand part of the funnel is essentially absent. Researchers
indeed omit negative values of the elasticity, which biases the mean reported estimate upwards.
We support our conclusions from the funnel plot using a more formal analysis following
Stanley (2005), who examines the correlation between the estimates and their standard errors:
Y EDij = Y ED0 + β · SE(Y EDij) + µij , (2)
where YED ij denotes i-th effect and its standard error SE(YED ij) estimated in the j-th study,
and µij is the error term. The intercept of the equation, YED0, is the true effect beyond
publication bias, represented by the coefficient on the standard error, β. If no publication bias
is present in the literature, the coefficient β should be zero (the methods used by researchers
imply that the ratio of the point estimate to the standard error has a t-distribution, which
means that the two variables should form statistically independent quantities). Otherwise, we
should observe that the estimated effects are correlated with their standard error, for example
because researchers with large standard errors need large point estimates to produce statistical
significance, or because they discard negative estimates, which yields a positive β due to the
heteroskedasticity of (2).
Figure 2: The funnel plot suggests publication bias
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Notes: The dashed vertical line indicates the median estimate of
the income elasticity of water demand; the solid vertical line indi-
cates the mean estimate of the income elasticity of water demand.
When there is no publication selection bias, the estimates should be
symmetrically distributed around the mean effect.
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Equation (2) can be presented as a funnel asymmetry test, as it follows from rotating the
axes of the funnel plot and inverting the value of precision to display the standard error. To
account for heteroskedasticity and within-study dependence in (2), we report robust standard
errors clustered at the study level. Further, we estimate different specifications: 1) the original
unweighted data sample, 2) weighting by the inverse of the number of estimates per study (small
and large studies are thus given the same importance), and 3) weighting by the inverse of the
standard error (precise estimates are given greater weight). We estimate each specification using
simple OLS with study-level fixed effects to account for unobserved study-level characteristics.
Table 3 presents the results of the funnel asymmetry tests. In Panel A of Table 3 we show
the different specifications of (2) applied to the full sample of 307 elasticity estimates. The
results corroborate the findings from the funnel plot that publication selection bias is present in
the literature on the income elasticity of water demand. The results from Panel A also place the
true effect in the literature at approximately 0.178, which means that increasing a household’s
income by one percent increases water demand by 0.18 percent. This value is fairly robust
throughout different estimations in Panel A (with one exception in the last column; nevertheless,
the combination of precision weighing and study fixed effects often produces unstable results).
The coefficient corresponding to publication bias has a positive sign, which means that the true
effect is probably smaller than what researchers tend to report on average. Our estimate of the
effect is relatively close to the mean estimate from Sebri (2014), who argue the number to be
half the mean reported by Dalhuisen et al. (2003).
As a complementary analysis, we show another visual test, the Galbraith plot, which focuses
on the bias caused by the preference for significant results. Authors who prefer significant results
and disregard insignificant estimates will over-report high t-values (in absolute terms). We
follow Stanley (2005) and Irsova et al. (2016) and define the standardized t-statistics T(YED ij)
adjusted for the true effect from Table 3:
T (Y EDij) =
Y EDij − Y ED0
SE(Y EDij)
, (3)
where YED0 represents the true effect estimated by the funnel asymmetry test, and YED ij
represents the i-th estimate of the income elasticity with SE(YED ij) as the corresponding
standard error reported in the j-th study. For YED0, we employ the baseline true effect from
the first column of Panel A in Table 3, 0.178, and plot the final statistics in Figure 3.
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Table 3: Tests show publication bias in estimates that control for endogeneity
Panel A: Whole Sample Unweighted Study Precision
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
SE (publication bias) 0.676∗∗ 0.551∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 1.280∗∗∗ 1.514
(0.305) (0.301) (0.132) (0.161) (0.369) (1.176)
Constant (effect beyond bias) 0.178∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.037) (0.022) (0.021) (0.012) (0.045)
Observations 307 307 307 307 307 307
Panel B: No Endogeneity Control Unweighted Study Precision
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
SE (publication bias) 0.290 0.286 0.753 0.523 1.010∗∗ 0.326
(0.307) (0.288) (0.576) (0.450) (0.405) (0.340)
Constant (effect beyond bias) 0.223∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0445) (0.0569) (0.0581) (0.0121) (0.0153)
Observations 142 142 142 142 142 142
Panel C: Endogeneity Control Unweighted Study Precision
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
SE (publication bias) 1.053∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 1.650∗∗∗ 3.689∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.437) (0.0942) (0.166) (0.490) (1.159)
Constant (effect beyond bias) 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.0959∗∗∗ 0.0631
(0.0327) (0.0421) (0.0246) (0.0217) (0.0153) (0.0396)
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165
Notes: The table reports the results of the regression Y EDij = Y ED0 + β · SE(Y EDij) + µij , where Y EDij denotes
i-th effect estimated in j-th study, and SE(Y EDij) denotes its standard error, estimated either by ordinary least squares
(OLS) or study-level fixed effects (FE). Panel A reports results for the full sample of estimates, Panel B reports the results
for the subset of elasticities computed by estimation methods not accounting for endogeneity in the demand function,
and Panel C reports the results for the sample where the estimation methods do account for endogeneity in the demand
function. Unweighted = model is not weighted; Study = model is weighted by the inverse of the number of estimates per
study; Precision = model is weighted by the inverse of the standard error of an estimate. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the study level.
Figure 3 represents a Galbraith plot, a scatter plot with the precision of an estimate
1/SE(Y EDij) on the horizontal axis against the standardized size of the t-statistics T (Y EDij)
on the vertical axis (Galbraith, 1990). Although a large number of estimates are situated be-
tween the two lines denoting the critical values of the t-statistic for the 5% significance level, the
plot indicates some publication bias since the number of the estimates outside the area defined
by the two dashed lines increases with precision. Figure 3 also indicates excess variation in the
standardized t-values since only 43% of the estimates fall into the area where they should be
given the properties of the t-statistic and the correctness of our estimate of the underlying elas-
ticity. It follows that researchers are more likely to prefer significant results over insignificant
results and possibly conduct a specification search to produce the desired outcomes.
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Figure 3: Galbraith plot suggests publication bias
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We have established thus far that, overall, the literature on the income elasticity of water
demand suffers from publication bias related to the sign and significance of the estimates. The
contamination of the literature by publication bias compels us to reassess the conclusions drawn
from comparing the average reported estimates for different subsamples with respect to data and
method choices. Especially, as Ashenfelter et al. (1999) note, researchers are often more likely to
report larger estimates to compensate for the large standard errors when instrumental variables
are employed. We show in Table 2 that, on average, the methods controlling for endogeneity and
not controlling for endogeneity do not yield any notable differences in elasticities. Following
Ashenfelter et al. (1999), we investigate whether there is selective reporting related to the
method choice that might drive the publication bias in the literature.
For the analysis, let us return to Table 3. Panels B and C of the table show the funnel
asymmetry tests applied to two groups of estimates: those that do not control for endogeneity
(Panel B) and those that do control for endogeneity (Panel C). We demonstrated in the previous
section that the mean reported estimates are very similar for both groups. The similarity dis-
appears, however, when we account for publication bias. We find no bias for estimates that do
not control for endogeneity, and the underlying elasticity for these estimates is approximately
0.22. Regarding the endogeneity-consistent estimates, however, we find evidence of substan-
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tial publication bias in the terminology of Doucouliagos & Stanley (2013). Here, the mean
estimate is therefore biased upwards, and the underlying elasticity is only 0.15 or less. Thus,
both endogeneity and publication biases matter. The studies that control for endogeneity bias
would tend to report estimates that are substantially smaller than OLS studies if they were not
more susceptible to publication selection. Publication bias in the better-specified studies arises
because researchers need larger estimates to offset large standard errors. There might exist,
however, other data and method choices that are also correlated with publication bias or the
underlying effect. We address these issues in the next section.
4 Why Do the Estimates Vary?
4.1 Variables and Estimation
Table 2 in Section 2 and Figure 5 in Appendix A present a first tentative examination of the
potential sources of heterogeneity behind the estimates of the income elasticity of water demand.
To more systematically investigate this heterogeneity, we augment regression (2) by including
a plethora of explanatory variables: 30 study design characteristics and the interaction term
between the standard error and a dummy variable that equals one if the study in question
does not control for endogeneity. The explanatory variables capturing the variation in data and
methodology are listed in Table 4; the table provides the definitions of the variables and their
summary statistics, including the simple mean, standard deviation, and the mean weighted by
the inverse of the number of observations extracted from a study.
For ease of exposition we divide the estimate and study characteristics into variables re-
flecting the specification of the demand function (8 aspects), price specification (2 aspects),
data characteristics (7 aspects), estimation technique (3 aspects), tariff structure (3 aspects),
countries examined (3 countries), and publication characteristics (4 aspects). We note that this
section merely serves as a means of discussing the main sources of heterogeneity and not as an
exhaustive survey of the methods used in the literature estimating water demand elasticities.
For a more detailed discussion we refer the reader to the previous and competently executed
meta-analyses of Dalhuisen et al. (2003) and Sebri (2014).
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Table 4: Description and summary statistics of regression variables
Variable Description Mean SD WM
Income elasticity The estimate of the income elasticity of water
demand.
0.261 0.377 0.270
Standard error The standard error of the estimate of the income
elasticity of water demand.
0.123 0.232 0.130
SE · No endog. control Interaction term between the standard error and
the estimation methods not addressing endo-
geneity.
0.071 0.178 0.053
Water demand specification
Household size = 1 if the demand equation controls for house-
hold size (usually defined as a number of persons
living in a household).
0.518 0.500 0.533
Population density = 1 if the demand equation controls for popu-
lation density (which often serves as a proxy for
lawn size).
0.107 0.310 0.099
Temperature = 1 if the demand equation controls for temper-
ature.
0.489 0.501 0.427
Rainfall = 1 if the demand equation controls for rainfall. 0.632 0.483 0.535
Evaporation = 1 if the demand equation controls for evapo-
ration.
0.130 0.337 0.161
Difference variable = 1 if the demand equation contains the vari-
able accounting for the difference between the
water bill priced at actual rates and the water
bill priced at marginal prices (Dalhuisen et al.,
2003).
0.156 0.364 0.218
Lagged dep. variable = 1 if the demand equation contains the lagged
dependent variable.
0.085 0.279 0.124
Discrete-continuous = 1 if the demand equation is based on the
discrete-continuous model.
0.107 0.310 0.125
Price specification
Marginal price = 1 if marginal price computed as the price of
the last cubic meter of water is used for estima-
tion (reference category for this group of dummy
variables: average price computed as the total
bill divided by total consumption).
0.401 0.491 0.462
Other price = 1 if a price other than marginal or average is
used for estimation (such as the Shin price de-
ployed by Shin, 1985).
0.130 0.337 0.198
Data characteristics
Long-run elasticity = 1 if the estimated elasticity is the long-term
instead of short-term elasticity.
0.296 0.457 0.237
Household data = 1 if residential data are used for the estima-
tion instead of data aggregated at the municipal
level (including residential, industrial, and com-
mercial water demand).
0.632 0.483 0.597
Daily data = 1 if the frequency of data used for estimation
is daily instead of quarterly, monthly, or annual.
0.189 0.392 0.161
Monthly data = 1 if the frequency of data used for estimation
is monthly instead of daily, monthly, or annual.
0.394 0.489 0.483
Continued on next page
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Table 4: Description and summary statistics of regression variables (continued)
Variable Description Mean SD WM
Annual data = 1 if the frequency of data used for estimation
is annual instead of daily, monthly, or quarterly.
0.235 0.424 0.242
Cross-section = 1 if cross-sectional data are used for estimation
instead of time-series or panel data.
0.293 0.456 0.334
Time-series = 1 if time series data are used for estimation
instead of cross-section or panel data.
0.029 0.029 0.086
Estimation technique
No endogeneity con-
trol
= 1 if the estimation method does not account
for endogeneity; typically ordinary least squares
(reference category for this group of dummy vari-
ables is the use of instrumental variables).
0.463 0.499 0.411
Panel technique = 1 if a fixed effects panel technique is employed
for estimation.
0.244 0.430 0.212
Other estimator = 1 if an estimation method accounting for en-
dogeneity other than instrumental variables and
panel fixed effects is employed for estimation.
0.111 0.314 0.208
Tariff structure
Flat tariff = 1 if a flat tariff structure is used for estimation
(reference category for this group of dummy vari-
ables is the situation in which the tariff structure
employed is not available).
0.078 0.269 0.121
Increasing tariff = 1 if an increasing tariff structure is used for
estimation.
0.485 0.501 0.526
Decreasing tariff = 1 if a decreasing tariff structure is used for
estimation.
0.023 0.150 0.031
Countries examined
Europe = 1 if the income elasticity of water demand is
estimated for a location in Europe, instead of the
US or other countries.
0.166 0.373 0.226
Other location = 1 if the income elasticity of water demand is
estimated for other location than Europe or the
US.
0.391 0.489 0.355
Developed countries = 1 if the income elasticity of water demand is
estimated for a developed country instead of de-
veloping country.
0.655 0.476 0.693
Publication characteristics
Publication year The publication year of the study (the base year
is the sample minimum: 1972).
30.29 11.36 30.02
Citations The average yearly number of citations the study
received in Google Scholar since its appearance
there.
4.494 6.724 4.385
Impact factor RePEc recursive discounted impact factor for
journals.
0.106 0.199 0.088
Published = 1 if the study is published in a peer-reviewed
journal.
0.799 0.416 0.839
Notes: SD = standard deviation, SE = standard error, WM = mean weighted by the inverse of the number of
estimates reported per study.
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Water demand specification. Researchers specify the water demand equation to reflect the
behavioral patterns of consumers under certain living conditions. We codify several of these
patterns and conditions as the possible sources of heterogeneity. For example, we include a
dummy for including a control for household size (the number of people living in a household)
since, due to economies of scale, individual consumption should decrease with an increase in
household size (Arbues et al., 2010). We also take into account whether the authors include
population density in their demand equation, which is often used as a proxy for the housing stock
and size of yards (Gaudin, 2005). Some authors include the difference variable, which reflects
the difference in the actual water bill and the water bill priced at marginal prices (Espey et al.,
1997), or as Dalhuisen et al. (2003) call it, a lump-sum transfer imposed by the tariff structure.
Moreover, Hewitt & Hanemann (1995) suggest using the discrete-continuous model to account
for the discrete price structure of water tariffs and the continuous consumption of water.
Dalhuisen et al. (2003) show that water demand is sensitive to weather factors. Some authors
(like Miaou, 1990) criticize the assumption of a linear relationship between water demand and
weather variables, suggesting that rainfall might have a dynamic effect on water consumption,
and investigate the possibility of a threshold beyond which precipitation or temperature does not
affect water use. We use dummy variables for studies that include information on temperature,
rainfall, and evaporation. We also code for whether the study makes a dynamic adjustment of
the demand model with a lagged dependent variable, which mostly reflects the fact that water
use is a habit and that time is required to change this habit in response to other, usually price
or weather, changes (Asci & Borisova, 2014). It is worth noting, however, that the inclusion of
the lagged dependent variable in the demand model can violate the assumptions of some simple
estimation techniques.
Price specification. Water is also considered to be inelastic in price because consumers
typically exhibit limited awareness of the pricing structure. The suitability of using the average,
the marginal, or other pricing schemes in the water demand function remains a matter of
heated discussion. On the one hand, Nauges & Van Den Berg (2009), among others, argue that
since consumers are rarely aware of their rate structure, they react to their average bill rather
than to their marginal bill. On the other hand, Saleth & Dinar (1997) argue that the use of
marginal pricing including the difference variable instead presupposes average price behavior
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and has many methodological advantages. Shin (1985) introduces a price-perception concept
that identifies which of the two prices (the marginal or the average price) is better understood
by consumers. Few researchers have followed in his footsteps; the recent work by (Binet et al.,
2014) proposes significant modifications to the functional form of Shin’s perceived price. The
reference category for this group of dummy variables is the average pricing scheme.
Data characteristics. Given the small differences between the averages of the short-run
and long-run elasticities found in Table 2, we do not divide the sample accordingly, but we
still control for this form of temporal dynamics in our model (which conforms to the practice
employed by the previous meta-analyses). Moreover, we take into account whether the study
uses household data only or aggregates the data at the municipal level, taking into account
household, industrial, and commercial water consumption. Although the residential elasticity
is considerable more important to us, given the relatively small number of observations in this
study, we also account for the aggregated estimates and err on the side of inclusion.
Another characteristic we focus on is the frequency of the data: higher frequencies provide
less-detailed information on immediate behavioral patterns, and although water is inelastic in
income, the granularity (in our case yearly, quarterly, monthly, and daily) also matters in the
previous meta-analyses. The reference category for the data frequency is the use of quarterly
data for estimation. We also distinguish among time series, cross-sectional data, and panel
data, using panel data as the reference category.
Estimation technique. The most commonly used estimation techniques are ordinary least
squares (Nieswiadomy & Molina, 1991), two-stage least squares (Nieswiadomy & Molina, 1991),
three-stage least squares (Al-Najjar et al., 2011), generalized method of moments (Musolesi &
Nosvelli, 2007), and panel techniques with random or fixed effects (Cheesman et al., 2008; Sebri,
2013). We mark all techniques that do not account for the endogeneity present in the demand
equation as No endogeneity control.1 Given that we find no publication bias in the estimates
produced by methods that ignore endogeneity, we hypothesize the endogeneity variable and the
1Note that if a flat tariff rate is imposed, the (constant) price of water is exogenous to water demand, and thus,
the endogeneity problem does not need to be addressed. As there are only 11 such observations of the elasticity
for a flat tariff structure estimated by OLS, we treat them as any other observation of the elasticity estimated
by techniques not accounting for endogeneity. Robustness checks, in which these estimates are eliminated, yield
very similar conclusions to those in Table 3 and Table 5.
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interaction term between the standard error and the endogeneity variable to be significant. The
reference category for this group of dummy variables is the instrumental variables estimation
method and its derivatives.
Tariff structure. Tariff structures help policy makers to control the demand for water. An
increasing structure, for example, means that the price is constant within discrete intervals of
use but increasing between the different intervals of use. The outcomes of such water policies
are, however, not always clear-cut. In the case of the increasing tariff structure, the policy is
expected to limit excessive consumption of water. This leads to higher real income, and if the
income elasticity of water demand is positive, higher real income results in higher demand for
water. It is unclear, however, which of these two effects prevails. To address such problems, we
include information on the use of flat, increasing, and decreasing tariff structures. The reference
category for this group of dummy variables is the situation in which the tariff structure employed
is not available.
Countries examined. The main reasons for cross-country heterogeneity are potential dif-
ferences in consumption habits, culture, climate, and path-dependency in policy. The previous
meta-analyses are rather inconclusive with respect to spatial variation: while Dalhuisen et al.
(2003) find a significant difference between income elasticity estimates for the US and Europe,
Sebri (2014) argues that this difference is insignificant. Hence, we distinguish among differ-
ent locations in the US, Europe (including Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, and Sweden), and any location outside the US and Europe (such as Aus-
tralia, Cambodia, Canada, China, Ecuador, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait,
Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and Vietnam). The reference category for this group of dummy variables is
the estimation of the income elasticity of water demand for a location in the US.
Furthermore, we distinguish between whether the study estimates the elasticity for a de-
veloped country or a developing country. The inhabitants of developing countries are forced
to consume a lower amount of water since they typically not have sufficient income to be able
to afford more; changes in income may thus have different effects in these countries compared
to developed countries. Similarly, we assume the water consumption of individuals living in
developed countries to be sufficient; hence, a change in income should not trigger a significant
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change in water consumption. Altogether, individuals from developed countries are expected to
dedicate a relatively lower proportion of their additional income to expenditures on water than
individuals from developing countries.
Publication characteristics. We employ several publication characteristics as proxies for
methodological advances that might not be directly captured by our methodological variables.
For example, the variable publication year could tell us whether newer studies tend to report
systematically different elasticities. To address the quality of a study, we use the average yearly
number of citations and the RePEc recursive discounted impact factor for journal publications.
We also distinguish between published (journal publications) and unpublished studies (working
papers and other unrefereed materials) since the previous meta-analyses also lack consensus
on this matter: while Dalhuisen et al. (2003) find that published estimates of elasticities are
smaller than the unpublished ones, Sebri (2014) finds the opposite.
Our intention is to examine whether the evidence for publication bias remains strong if we
control for the possible causes of heterogeneity. Ideally, we would like to regress the collected
income elasticities of water demand on all of the explanatory variables at hand (like Dalhuisen
et al., 2003; Sebri, 2014, do). Given that we have so many variables, however, some of them
will likely be insignificant, which would inflate the variation of other estimated parameters in
the regression and introduce inefficiency. Alternatively, sequential t-tests can be employed, but
eliminating insignificant variables one by one might lead to a loss of important variables during
the process. Following Havranek & Irsova (2016) and Havranek et al. (2016) we instead employ
Bayesian model averaging (BMA), which formally addresses such model uncertainty. BMA goes
through millions of different models created from the subsamples of the potential explanatory
variables and searches for those models with the highest explanatory power. In a Bayesian
setting, the model’s explanatory power is represented by the posterior model probability, which
is analogous to the adjusted coefficient of determination in frequentist econometrics.
Since we use the bma package in R (Feldkircher & Zeugner, 2012), our BMA does not esti-
mate all of the 232 possible combinations of models but uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo samplers
that propose the candidate models to be estimated (estimating all of the models would take sev-
eral months). The estimated BMA coefficients, posterior means, are averages of the coefficients
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across all of the models, weighted by the posterior model probability. Thus, each coefficient has
an approximately symmetrical distribution with a posterior standard deviation, which is anal-
ogous to the standard error in frequentist econometrics. Each coefficient is assigned a posterior
inclusion probability, the sum of posterior model probabilities from all of the models in which
the variable is found, which is analogous to statistical significance in frequentist econometrics.
Further details on BMA can be found, for example, in Eicher et al. (2011).
4.2 Results
Figure 4 presents the results of the BMA exercise. The columns represent different models
and are sorted by posterior model probability in descending order from left to right. The rows
represent different variables and are sorted by posterior inclusion probability in descending order
from top to bottom. Each cell thus belongs to a particular variable in a particular model: if the
cell is blue (darker in grayscale), the coefficient of a variable is positive; if the cell is red (lighter
in grayscale), the coefficient is negative; if there is no color, the variable is excluded from the
model. We observe that almost half of the variables are included in the best model, and the
sign of these variables is robust across different models.
The numerical results of the BMA exercise are reported in Table 5 (we follow Eicher et al.,
2011, definitions of parameter and model priors). In addition, we report an OLS regression,
which includes 14 explanatory variables recognized by the bma package in R to form the top
model. The OLS results are consistent with BMA: the estimated coefficients have the same sign
and are similar in magnitude; the significance of the estimated parameters mostly corresponds
to the values of the posterior inclusion probability. When interpreting the posterior inclusion
probability, we follow Jeffreys (1961), who find evidence of an effect that is weak for a value
between 0.5 and 0.75, positive for a value between 0.75 and 0.95, strong for a value between 0.95
and 0.99, and decisive for a value higher than 0.99. Therefore, we find weak evidence for the
presence of an effect of the variables Difference variable, Daily data, Other location, Citations,
Impact factor, and Published ; we find positive evidence for the variables Temperature and Other
price; and we find decisive evidence for the Standard error and the interaction term SE · No
endog. control.
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Publication bias and endogeneity. For only two variables is there decisive evidence that
they influence the estimated elasticities: Standard error and its interaction with techniques
not controlling for endogeneity SE · No endog. control. The significance of standard error
corresponds to the conclusion that publication bias is present in the literature and the estimated
coefficient for publication bias survives the inclusion of data and method heterogeneity. We also
confirm that the estimates produced by techniques not accounting for endogeneity suffer less
from publication bias. Due to the low posterior inclusion probability, BMA did not recognize the
variable No endog. control as relevant; however, BMA includes the variable No endog. control
in the top model, which we use for our frequentist check, where the parameter corresponding to
that variable is found to be significant and positive (and is thus in line with the intuition and
our analysis from the previous section). When endogeneity is accounted for (variable No endog.
control = 0), the effect of publication bias corrected for various sources of heterogeneity is 0.956,
only marginally smaller than what is presented in Panel C of Table 3. We conclude that the
two variables reflecting publication bias are crucial for explaining the differences between the
reported estimates of the income elasticity.
Water demand specification. According to our results, the inclusion of one weather vari-
able can particularly drive the estimated elasticities: authors taking into account the outside
Temperature find the demand for water to be more income elastic (contrary to those not in-
cluding the variable, who find the income elasticity to be 0.12 smaller if other factors are held
constant). This conclusion contradicts the main results of Dalhuisen et al. (2003), who instead
find the inclusion of the evaporation variable to be important, or Sebri (2014), who find that
controlling for rainfall drives the results (although the robustness check of Sebri, 2014, is in
accordance with Table 5). Higher temperature triggers an increase in the demand for water,
which can be addressed by spending a higher proportion of income on water; thus, it is sensible
to include the temperature in a demand function.
BMA acknowledges only weak evidence for the importance of the Difference variable: the
inclusion of this variable increases the differences between the marginal price specification and
the average price specification (the frequentist check confirms the significance of its impact).
The evidence for the importance of the dynamic model (the inclusion of the Lagged dependent
variable) is even weaker, and given the results of the robustness check we are inclined to disregard
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it as a driver of the income elasticity. We do not confirm the previous findings of Sebri (2014),
who supports the results of Dalhuisen et al. (2003) showing that that the use of the discrete-
continuous model has a negative effect on the income elasticity.
Price specification and tariff structure. If a price specification other than average or
marginal approach is used in the water demand equation, the income elasticity estimates are on
average 0.16 higher, ceteris paribus. This result contradicts Dalhuisen et al. (2003) and Sebri
(2014), who find the differences among the price specifications to be statistically indistinguish-
able. While BMA determined a very weak impact of different tariff structures on the estimated
income elasticity, the frequentist check indicates some systematic dependencies: non-flat tariffs
make the demand for water more inelastic and indeed seem to be significantly different from
flat and other tariff structures, which is in accordance with theory (a more detailed discussion
of the theoretical relationship between tariff structures and income elasticity can be found in
Dalhuisen et al., 2001). The choice of a certain tariff structure would then be a suitable policy
tool for affecting the elasticity of consumers.
Countries examined. The income elasticity of water demand estimated for a location other
than Europe and the US tends to be approximately 0.1 lower when compared to the elasticity
estimated for the US. Given that this is the only spatial variation detected in our model,
we challenge not only Dalhuisen et al. (2003), who find differences between income elasticity
estimates for Europe and the US, bus also Sebri (2014), who observes no spatial variation
at all. One outcome for spatial variation that would be consistent with the previous meta-
analyses would be evidence of no difference between the income elasticities for developed and
developing countries. It follows that a developing country with similar structural parameters
to those of a developed country can conduct similar water demand policy. This finding is close
to the concept of technology adoption and supports the theory of conditional convergence. It
should not, however, be applied unconditionally, as there is evidence for spatial variation across
continents.
Data and publication characteristics. In accordance with Dalhuisen et al. (2003) and
Sebri (2014), we argue that the estimates of the income elasticity of water demand are insensitive
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Table 5: Explaining heterogeneity in the estimates of the income elasticity of water demand
Response variable: Bayesian model averaging Frequentist check (OLS)
Income elasticity Post. mean Post. SD PIP Coef. Std. error p-value
Constant 0.206 NA 1.000 0.245 0.049 0.000
Standard error 0.956 0.130 1.000 1.039 0.259 0.000
SE · No endog. control -0.572 0.175 0.992 -0.714 0.431 0.097
Water demand specification
Household size -0.001 0.008 0.027
Population density -0.001 0.013 0.027
Temperature 0.118 0.074 0.807 0.151 0.055 0.006
Rainfall 0.006 0.027 0.082
Evaporation 0.018 0.062 0.116
Difference variable 0.083 0.088 0.543 0.144 0.057 0.011
Lagged dependent variable 0.077 0.108 0.396 0.122 0.101 0.228
Discrete-continuous 0.001 0.014 0.026
Price specification
Marginal price 0.004 0.021 0.062
Other price 0.154 0.092 0.818 0.159 0.074 0.032
Data characteristics
Long-run elasticity -0.007 0.028 0.091
Household data 0.035 0.066 0.271
Daily data -0.126 0.130 0.573 -0.167 0.061 0.007
Monthly data 0.009 0.032 0.108
Annual data 0.008 0.036 0.089
Cross-section -0.001 0.009 0.027
Time-series -0.007 0.043 0.054
Estimation technique
No endog. control 0.021 0.044 0.223 0.084 0.039 0.033
Panel technique 0.000 0.010 0.025
Other estimator -0.005 0.025 0.055
Tariff structure
Flat tariff -0.004 0.027 0.048
Increasing tariff -0.059 0.072 0.467 -0.099 0.051 0.053
Decreasing tariff -0.141 0.182 0.445 -0.279 0.127 0.028
Countries examined
Europe -0.006 0.027 0.066
Other location -0.090 0.090 0.586 -0.084 0.046 0.069
Developed countries 0.006 0.042 0.101
Publication characteristics
Publication year 0.000 0.001 0.037
Citations 0.007 0.007 0.615 0.012 0.004 0.001
Impact factor -0.232 0.181 0.707 -0.274 0.148 0.065
Published -0.102 0.089 0.650 -0.172 0.054 0.001
Studies 62 62
Observations 307 307
Notes: SD = Standard deviation. PIP = posterior inclusion probability. The frequentist check includes the variables
recognized by BMA as comprising the best model. Standard errors are clustered at the study level. All variables are
described in Table 4. Additional details on the BMA exercise can be found in the Appendix B.
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to the use of household or aggregate data. Nevertheless, the usage of daily data seems to produce
systematically smaller elasticities, although BMA only suggests weak evidence for this effect.
The income elasticities reported in Published studies are arguably smaller than those in studies
coming from unrefereed sources; this effect becomes stronger with an increasing Impact factor
of the publication outlet. It is also important to note, however, that studies reporting higher
estimates attract greater attention from readers (since these papers acquire a higher number
of Citations), but this effect is not economically significant. Thus, we identify the presence of
effects unobserved by the methodological variables hidden in publication status and that the
direction of their estimates is in line with the conclusions of Dalhuisen et al. (2003): published
studies tend to report smaller elasticities than do unpublished studies.
We have established thus far that the mean estimated income elasticity of water demand,
0.27 (reported in Table 2), is influenced to a large extent by publication bias, methodology, and
data heterogeneity. By accounting for publication bias in the literature we reduce the mean
estimate to 0.15—when preference is also given to studies that correct for the endogeneity bias
(Table 3). The estimate is, however, still not free from other potential biases resulting from
data, method, and publication heterogeneity. To estimate the underlying elasticity beyond all
of these effects, we construct a synthetic study that employs the preferred method, data, and
publication choices and uses all of the information in the literature. Such a “best-practice”
estimate is inevitably subject to the subjective decision of what the most appropriate methods,
data, and publication choices are. Therefore, we execute several robustness checks to check the
sensitivity of our conclusions.
The best-practice estimate is a result of a linear combination of the BMA coefficients from
Table 5 and our chosen values for the respective variables. We prefer newer studies published in
outlets with a large impact factor and those receiving a high number of citations; we also prefer
the use of broader data sets and methodologies that correct for endogeneity bias. Therefore,
we set the values of the control variables of the demand equation, data with daily granularity,
methods controlling for endogeneity, and publication characteristics at their sample maxima.
Further, we set the values of the variables indicating the presence of publication bias, higher
than daily granularity data, cross-sectional and time series data, and the estimation techniques
not controlling for endogeneity at their sample minima. We leave the rest of the variables at
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their sample means but distinguish between the average pricing scheme and the marginal pricing
scheme, as there is no clear preference for either of these schemes in the literature.
The best-practice estimation yields an elasticity of 0.082 with a 95% confidence interval of
(−0.242, 0.407) for the average pricing scheme and an elasticity of 0.169 with a 95% confidence
interval of (−0.155, 0.493) for the marginal pricing scheme. The confidence intervals are approx-
imate and constructed using the standard errors estimated by OLS. Although the confidence
intervals are wide, the plausible changes in the definition of the best practice (such as setting
Lagged variable at the sample minimum or Discrete-continuous model choice at the sample
maximum) changes the best-practice estimates at the third decimal place only. We conclude
that the income elasticity of water demand is on average 0.15 or less and does not exceed the
value of 0.5 with 95% probability, meaning that it is highly unlikely that a one-percentage-point
increase in income would lead to more than a 0.5% increase in the demand for water.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper quantitatively surveys 307 estimates of the income elasticity of water demand while
concentrating on three main issues not addressed by the previous meta-analyses on the topic.
First, we take a closer look at publication selection bias stemming from the expected and
theory-supported preferences of researchers, referees, and editors for positive and statistically
significant results. Second, we focus on the problem of endogeneity bias and investigate the
differences in estimates produced by different estimation techniques, still accounting for the
potential influences of publication bias. Third, we investigate other sources of heterogeneity
behind the estimates proposed by the previous meta-analyses of Dalhuisen et al. (2003) and Sebri
(2014); extending their analysis, in this paper we account for the model uncertainty inherent in
meta-analysis, which is due to the large number of explanatory variables, using Bayesian model
averaging. We produce a best-practice estimate which suggests that the income elasticity is
on average much smaller than commonly thought. This can be perceived as good news for the
future availability of drinking water.
The literature on the income elasticity of water demand suffers from two major problems:
endogeneity bias and publication bias. Our results suggest that the estimation methods ignor-
ing endogeneity typically exaggerate the mean elasticity, despite that they do not suffer from
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publication bias. By contrast, the estimation methods controlling for endogeneity do not suffer
from endogeneity bias, but since they typically report large standard errors, publication bias
causes the reported estimates computed using these methods to also exaggerate the underly-
ing elasticity (the simple average of estimates is 0.26, while the underlying effect corrected for
publication bias is 0.15). Therefore, although more consistent estimation techniques eliminate
endogeneity bias at the micro level, they lead to the publication selection problem that affects
the entire literature by pushing the average reported income elasticity upwards. It is difficult
to disentangle these two biases without deploying the statistical tools of meta-analysis.
Our results concerning publication bias are robust to controlling for various other sources of
heterogeneity at the level of estimates or studies. Apart from the aspects related to publication
and endogeneity bias, several method and data characteristics wield a systematic influence on
the size of the reported elasticities. Including a control for temperature in demand equations
has a particularly strong impact on the estimated elasticities, as does the usage of other than
marginal or average price, both factors that increase the reported elasticities. Lower data
granularity and non-flat tariff systems are associated with smaller elasticities. Nevertheless,
although we collect 32 aspects of study design and control for publication bias, we are still
unable to explain almost 50% of the variation in the reported elasticities, which leaves ample
scope for further research on this important topic.
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A Study Heterogeneity
Figure 5: Estimates of the elasticity vary within and across studies
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Notes: The figure shows a box plot of the estimates of the income elasticity of water demand reported
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The search query is available here.
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B Diagnostics of BMA
Table 6: Summary of BMA estimation: UIP
Mean no. regressors Draws Burn-ins Time No. models visited
12.801 3 · 105 1 · 105 2.887989 mins 89,381
Modelspace Visited Topmodels Corr PMP No. obs.
4.30E+09 21% 93% 0.9714 307
Model prior g-prior Shrinkage-stats
Uniform/16 UIP Av = 0.9968
Notes: We employ the priors suggested by Eicher et al. (2011), who recommend using the
uniform model prior (each model has the same prior probability) and the unit information prior
(the prior provides the same amount of information as one observation from the data).
Figure 6: Model size and convergence, BMA with priors according to Eicher et al. (2011)
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